Archive for June, 2009

Have We Been Here Before?

Like many people working in development, I’ve been affected by a strain of aid angst in the last few years, and have blogged about this in a previous incarnation.

Aid’s internal crisis is gathering steam: Dambisa Moyo is the centre of a great deal of attention; Bill Easterly has been mud-wrestling with Jeffrey Sachs; and in relative sotto, others such as Yash Tandon have been more virulent in their criticisms, with deeper flaws in their analysis. The problems in Moyo’s Dead Aid analysis have been autopsied sufficiently, but the central premise retains power: aid has had significant unintended consequences, and has achieved relatively little against most macro-indicators of development, especially in Africa.

Historically, aid is a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, if we acknowledge the profound structural, motivational and political differences between the goals and methods of the Marshall Plan and other efforts of economic generation and regeneration that have followed wars, aid in its current form is still in its infancy as a component of historical processes of development. As a result, some of the most interesting writing on the process of development assumes no aid at all.  One such example (here greatly abridged and simplified) is particularly instructive. Indeed, it gives us a strong sense of what the alternatives to aid are, given that it barely considers it to be a possibility.

In 1954, Michal Kalecki wrote a paper entitled ‘The Problem of Financing Economic Development’. Kalecki was a Marxist, which may put off some readers, but this is incidental to many of the insights he raises in his analysis. Put simply, his central concern is how the rapid increase in investment required to generate and sustain an increase in the productive capacity of an economy can be financed without causing undue pressure on inflation or real wages, and without causing other unintended social or economic consequences. He does this through a model of the economy which examines the production of consumption goods and investment goods, through the investment, consumption, savings, taxes and trading behaviour of capitalists, workers and small proprietors. It’s this approach that demonstrates his Marxism; however, his concern with macroeconomic stability in the face of stimuli to demand and supply reflects a very modern sensibility.

The central challenge in an economy that does not receive international capital flows (aid, loans or direct investment) is that to develop, the economy must demonstrate an increase in productivity and production of mass industrial consumption goods (i.e. through investment) as well as in agriculture, near-simultaneously. Failing this, one or more of several problems may occur, chief among which are the dangers of inflationary spirals, under-utilised capacity, locally concentrated unemployment and restrained effective demand.

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Bewitched

A report of the BBC News Africa website describes the horrific burning to death of several suspected witches in rural western Kenya.

The prevalence of the belief in witchcraft in Sub-Saharan Africa hasn’t received much attention in the development econ literature (it, of course is covered by other disciplines). Mark Koyama at the Oxonomics blog has a great post on the history of witch killings, as well as very convincing argument about the reasons behind the violence we see in modern SSA:

My view is that ‘witches’ comprised individuals from two groups:

  1. Those individuals who refused to cooperate or failed to contribute their share in some communal risk-sharing activity.
  2. Those individuals who because they were old, infirm, widowed or without kin, were dependent on the support of others.

Mark’s second point is related to the work of Edward Miguel on poverty and witch killings (PDF version of his 2004 paper here) which gave compelling evidence from rural Tanzania of the danger of being old and female during the lean season: retrospective data from villages revealed that witch killings were more likely to occur when food ability was low (in the lean season and during times of crop failure) and that the victims were overwhelmingly old women.

Miguel’s reasoning is convincing: those with the least amount of social power and income-earning capacity are more likely to be violently ejected from the household. Yet I’m more concerned with Mark’s first idea: that witch killings (or just accusations of witch craft) are a response to the reneging on some social contract, often a risk-sharing or income-pooling agreement.

When I lived in Malawi, the papers were full of witchcraft stories and accusations. The conventional wisdom that those that were accused were often those that were seen as the successful, the tallest of the poppys, that refuse to share their success with others. The standard risk-sharing network models predict that those that are extremely successful  are more likely to break away from their social contracts. These models often posit that risk-sharing networks punish those that go back on their obligations, and it is reasonable that an accusation of witchcraft would be an effective punishment.

How could we test this? We’d need data on witchcraft activity and perhaps on rainfall data (risk-sharing networks are more likely to fall apart when there is a community level shock, usually through rainfall). The latter is easy to measure, but not the former.

At this point I’ll delegate to a more nuanced discussion of witchcraft.

Other links:

How to defeat witchcraft

Witchcraft and Mob Justice in Malawi

Africa Have-Your-Say asks the wrong question, as always

Slow start

Hey there! Welcome to the blog. I apologise for this initial trickle of postings: I’ve made the error of attempting to go from full time academic study to full-throttle blogger in just a few days (whilst on vacation). Expect something approximating “full service” by next week!

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Poverty Safari

Keep a safe distance

Keep a safe distance

Through Aid Watch I stumbled upon this excellent article in the Huffington post by Senegalese businesswoman Magatte Wade. She tackles the implicit condescension in ventures like Jeffrey Sach’s Millennium Village project, slyly comparing it to “polite” racism she experienced in France. The main subject of her wrath is a cultural enrichment tour group organised by New Dawn Associates, a group of academics who take foreigners on guided tours around the Millennium Village. Wade fishes out some slightly perturbing recommendations made in the NDA brochure, including:

Please do not give anything to the villagers – no sweets, cookies, empty water bottles, pens or even money.

and

Please do not eat or drink in public. Many people in the Bugesera District are still suffering from malnutrition, and the public consumption of food or drinks is against the culture of the area.

Firstly, as Easterly points out: if this is one of the holy Millenium Villages, why are people still starving? Secondly, do these statements sound familiar? (Please do not feed the animals). The whole venture smacks deeply of a new, dasterdly form of poverty porn: the poverty safari! You too, from the safety of your 4×4, can get to experience the overwhelming poverty of the Rwandan people, only to escape back to your hotel in the evening.

Easterly is unsurprisingly outraged. This sounds like another case of good intentions gone awry. However, is this truly a case of a bunch of Western academics viewing Africans as cardboard cutouts? An actual visit to the NDA website reveals that most of the staff and the entire top management are actually African. Does this lend this venture any more cred? I really don’t know.

The Wade article from which all this sprung is quite a good read and can be found here.

UPDATE: Hmm, the NDA website seems to have inverted since I first looked at it. The top staff are now all white foreigners. The head is Dr. Michael Grosspietsch, who has responded to Bill Easterly here.

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Stealing elections for dummies: Part 1

The post-election turmoil in Iran doesn’t seem to be improving. Despite the large amount of press the crisis is receiving, there doesn’t seem to be much of a consensus about what, if anything, the rest of the world can do but watch and wait.

One of the less controversial things we can do is sit down and analyse the election data. Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco describe their analysis of provincial data from the Iranian election. It turns out that a great place to look for falsified data is in the last two digits: humans are just bad at making up numbers randomly.

The numbers look suspicious. We find too many 7s and not enough 5s in the last digit. We expect each digit (0, 1, 2, and so on) to appear at the end of 10 percent of the vote counts. But in Iran’s provincial results, the digit 7 appears 17 percent of the time, and only 4 percent of the results end in the number 5. Two such departures from the average — a spike of 17 percent or more in one digit and a drop to 4 percent or less in another — are extremely unlikely. Fewer than four in a hundred non-fraudulent elections would produce such numbers.

More here, at the Washington Post, as well as here.

Hat tip to Chris Blattman for the link.

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