"Over the line! Mark it zero, Dude!"

Lee has a thought provoking post about institutions over at his blog. Responding to criticisms that the idea is too diffuse and difficult to pin down, he expresses admiration for Paul Romer’s use of the term ‘rules’ rather than the vaguer terms ‘institutions’ and ‘good governance’ (though this is ancillary to his main point, that migration reduces the importance of institutional change). He’s right – it is a more concrete term, but I still take great issue with the way the concept has been used by Romer.

Romer has made rules the centrepiece of his Charter Cities idea. For him, rules are the laws, regulations and norms that govern an economy and society. The Charter Cities idea runs on two central premises: one is that developing country Governments don’t have the right rules or the capacity to enforce them properly. The second is that the ‘correct’ rules are known and can be imported, as can enforcement capacity.

I don’t for a second doubt that rules and enforcement are deeply important for economic development, whether you want to call the bundle of policy associated with all of this institutional economics or governance reform. There are a great number of examples of this historically. When historians debate why the Great Transformation of the Industrial Revolution and rapid economic development occurred in the West and not in other historical centres of commerce such as China, India and parts of the Middle and Near East, one of the most important factors is the emergence of a clear set of rules relating to property and financial intermediation, as well as the improving functioning of the legal system in Britain and the US in particular. Another example is the emergence of property law in the US, which Hernando De Soto has convincingly argued was central to the development of capitalism in the US.

There are also examples of rules that were imported to power economic progress. In particular, when the British brought their banking and legal system to India, it caused a massive spark in Indian businesses: increased investment and hence a more dynamic economy emerged out of the ability to lend and borrow against clear rules.

That said, the reality of how rules emerge and are enforced is far more complex than Romer and many advocates of good governance and institutional approaches to economics recognise. I’ve seen a lot of people write some variation of ‘we know what good rules are’ or ‘we have a good understanding of what institutions stimulate development’. Despite this, I’ve never seen anyone actually set down on paper exactly what the correct legal framework and institutional makeup for development is. If we really did know what worked, surly someone would have written a fairly uncontroversial but best-selling book about this, right?

The basic problem is that we have a fairly good knowledge of what rules and institutions work pretty well where we live, and we assume that these are objectively ‘good’ rules and institutions. Not enough consideration is given to matters of variance across time and space. This is extremely important when considering rules and institutional policy for developing countries.

The first point to make is that rules vary in important ways across space. This is obvious. When people say that ‘we know the rules that make for good development’ do they think that rules (any rules) are the same in all places? A passing interest in world affairs will demonstrate that very important rules are different in different places. Take laws on rape. Most people would assume that laws on something as awful as rape would be relatively straightforward. They’re not. The legal framework around constitutes rape varies across countries quite significantly. Statutory rape is a good example of this. In France, in order to be convicted of statutory rape, it has to be proven that the accused knew the age of the victim. In other words, it’s actually a legitimate legal argument in France to say ‘well, she sure looked old enough!’ Such knowledge does not need to be proven under UK law, for example. Even the basic set of possible verdicts can vary. In some countries, a case can return a verdict of ‘not proven’ – which is different to saying the defendant is guilty or innocent.

Continue reading

Revolution, Oppression, Ornithology and a semi-Charter City

One of the incredible monolithic churches in Lalibela, Bet Giyorgis

Apologies for my long blogging silence. I’ve been almost completely off the grid for a holiday in Ethiopia (with a short detour to Djibouti) for the last couple of weeks. I checked my e-mail only a couple of times, and completely avoided Facebook. It was glorious.

Still, Ethiopia gives one the blogging bug. Historically, culturally, archaeologically and politically it must be one of the most interesting countries I’ve ever had the good fortune to visit. Without claiming any kind of in-depth analysis, a number of things occurred to me in the last couple of weeks, things I’d be interested to explore further or hear about from people who have already done so. I also saw some interesting economic developments in Djibouti that I’d be really keen to get more of an insight into.

First are the politics. A while ago I wrote a post speculating as to why popular revolt and revolution are so rare in Africa, when so many countries seem to have many of the characteristics that would make them likely. Ethiopia is an exception to this rule. It has experienced a genuine revolution, which led to the fall of the Mengitsu, effected by civil war with the aim of regime change (not solely for secession, though this was the aim of a subset of the combatants). While in Ethiopia, I picked up a book, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, by Gebru Tareke, which shows that prior to the revolution, peasant revolt and rebellion was common enough to dissipate state resources and demand remedial action. Tareke argues that rebellion was a relatively rare phenomenon in Ethiopia compared to peasantries elsewhere in the world, but nonetheless, this still marks it out as historically more prone to rebellion than the rest of Africa.

Why Ethiopia? What has made revolution and rebellion occur here? One reason might be that the extremely strong influence of Orthodox Christianity provides an alternative source of authority to the state, thereby making challenge of the leaders more palatable. Historically the monarchy sought legitimacy by patronising the Church, once conversion was widespread – the incredible monolithic churches of Lalibela stem from this impulse. It may be that by providing an alternative authority, one which is relatively unified in voice, the authority of the state can more effectively be challenged by Ethiopians. Yet this could hardly be more than a minor part of the story. The organisation of so many people, encompassing a number of diverse tribes and linguistic groups must have been extraordinarily difficult if revolt was to be anything other than local. I’d be really interested to hear from anyone who knows more about this.

Yet, despite the rebellious and revolutionary past of Ethiopia, its polity has remained resolutely centralised and undemocratic. It was ruled as a serious of Kingdoms from the beginning of its recorded history (gorgeously preserved in Axum and Gondar, with many more treasures under the ground waiting for excavation); after a brief interlude of Fascist occupation, the monarchy was restored under Haile Selassie, before a military coup replaced it with the Communist Council or Derg, ruling as a dictatorship of enormous brutality. Following civil war, the Derg collapsed and was replaced by the ‘democratic’ Government of Meles Zenawi, which took 99% of the elected seats in Ethiopian Government in the elections of 2010, to general incredulity. This does not seem to be an especially open or subtle Government. In almost every place we went we either met or heard about communities that were being forcibly evicted from their land, often to make way for new commercial buildings, for what was usually claimed to be inadequate compensation.

Continue reading

Living Just Enough for the City? Extended Thoughts on the Charter Cities Proposal

The worst case scenario?

The worst case scenario?

Has everyone heard about Paul Romer’s Charter Cities idea yet? Chris Blattman heard him speak about it recently, announced himself interested and unconvinced – and Romer responded eloquently within a week. Aid Watch even gave him a Q&A in which to explain it all just the other day. It’s a radical concept getting a lot of press (or blog, rather).

Though the Charter City concept is sold a little bit like a home shopping network product (‘Yes – you too can create a developed state in just five easy steps’) we should not undervalue the innovative thinking it embodies. Romer wants to grow new dependent micro-states that can house the poor from less developed countries in a functional economy and service-provision unit. The thinking behind the idea can be summarized by these two quotes, both from Romer:

All it takes to grow a charter city is an unoccupied piece of land and a charter. The human, material, and financial resources needed to build a new city will follow, attracted by the chance to work together under the good rules that the charter specifies.

Sounds simple, but the devil is in the details:

The key … lies in timing. The charter comes first, then residents, investors, and employers each decide whether to come live under the rules that it specifies. Historically, the ability to vote with one’s feet has been a powerful force for progress. Charter cities offer a chance to amplify it, dramatically improving the rate at which people get access to better rules.

I’ve got a something of a personal interest in this. I come from a Charter City. At least, I think I do. I was born and raised in Hong Kong, an example that gets cited a lot when people talk about the concept though I point out below that I recognize very little of what Romer describes as ‘Hong Kong’ or her history.

He describes the One Country, Two Systems approach, in which China agreed to absorb Hong Kong without changing the Basic Law put in place by the British for 50 years as a Charter (incidentally, this is why Wong Kar-Wai’s magical sequel to In the Mood for Love was set in 2046). Of course, most Hong Kongers were emphatically not allowed to vote with their feet: the vast majority were unable to secure British citizenship and remained in Hong Kong under Chinese rule. Many who could win citizenship elsewhere voted for Vancouver.

Knowing the likelihood of my interest Matt alerted me to the idea a few months back, and I’ve been reading reactions with interest. I think the idea is profoundly and fatally flawed due to Romer’s ahistorical approach. Equally importantly, there are two major positives to the idea that should be more fully articulated and understood, so important are they. They are completely new – groundbreaking in the true sense of the word – and speak to what I see as the central problems of economic transformation.

Continue reading