A few weeks ago, Nick Eubank wrote a piece about Somaliland in the Guardianâ€™s Poverty Matters blog. Somaliland is an interesting one â€“ itâ€™s a state that is not officially recognized and therefore in receipt of less aid than would be expected (though it is incorrect to assert, as he does, that it receives no foreign aid), but is performing well above reasonable expectations. They have a pretty well-functioning democracy, biometric passports â€“ like Lee, I still canâ€™t get over this â€“ and pretty good economic performance.
Eubank suggests that itâ€™s the very lack of aid and subsequent development of tax structures that has led to Somalilandâ€™s good performance, a view to which I have some sympathy. Iâ€™ve written in the past about why developing taxation systems is crucially important for all developing countries and why it tends to be difficult. If a side-effect of Somalilandâ€™s lack of access to aid is being forced to be more representative and more developmental, could there possibly be a benefit to restricting rather than increasing aid volumes?
Itâ€™s a provocative idea, because it flies in the face of almost everything weâ€™re led to believe about development and levels of development funding, but as a thought experiment, itâ€™s worth considering. It would be likely to yield specific benefits:
- Most obviously, it incentivizes the creation of a viable tax regime with the benefits of accountability, representation and responsiveness that issue from one
- It also creates far more pressure to achieve concrete and valuable results than any system of performance assessment â€“ strictly limited aid volumes makes failure far more costly
- Ownership would take a big boost. The biggest boon to local ownership of the aid agenda would be the ability and necessity to refuse aid packages that are not wanted. If bad aid or aid out of line with the local development vision replaces good aid, the incentive to exercise ownership of the agenda and refuse the aid is that much higher
- A limited volume of aid would mean that the limited management capacity of local institutions is not stretched over hundreds of projects and programmes (as is the case now), but focused on a few tightly prioritized programmes, with consequent benefits for implementation.
Offsetting these benefits is the obvious drawback that much of what needs to be done could not be financed with a strict aid ceiling. The value of the thought experiment is not to assess whether we should cap aid, but to see what benefits it would bring so we can work out how to generate these benefits without limiting aid volumes. The hardest two to incentivize without some resource constraint are the improved ownership (which really requires that local institutions to refuse aid far more than they actually do) and the management effects. Suggestions welcome.
Staying in the region, Chris Blattman also linked to a paper suggesting that Somalia was better off without a state. While the writer of the original paper seems to be a libertarian (and somehow the headline â€˜Libertarian Dislikes Governmentâ€™ isnâ€™t all that shocking), it does make an interesting basic point: the correct counterfactual when we consider poorly governed or chaotic states is not a â€˜goodâ€™ Government, but a â€˜differentâ€™ one. This is something to bear in mind when we consider countries with corrupt, dictatorial or ineffectual Governments. Very often itâ€™s not the specific leadership or political party that is at the root of bad governance or decline, but the structural characteristics of their rule: their relationship with the opposition, their relationships with the public, their ability to govern effectively and the options open to them. In very different contexts Iâ€™ve argued this for Malawi and Zimbabwe. In Malawi, the same leadership was fine in one political context and dictatorial in another. In Zimbabwe, the temptation to lay all blame at the feet of a very convenient (and abhorrent) villain blinds many to the complex roots of his crimes and Zimbabweâ€™s decline. The saddest thing is that this point is often neglected even by immensely powerful decision makers â€“ the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq both show marks of this error.
Going back to the original article, is there a case to be made for statelessness when the Government is predatory? The argument is strongest in the static view, comparing a bad state and statelessness. The more dynamic the view taken, where we consider how tyrannical or corrupt regimes can become effective ones, the less this view makes sense, though itâ€™s also true that plenty of tyrannical regimes didnâ€™t evolve but were overthrown. Again, the thought experiment of whether some developing countries would be better off stateless is most valuable in focusing our attention on the long term needs and real dynamics of state building â€“ not just in terms of building institutions but understanding how bad or predatory institutions can evolve into good ones. Itâ€™s happened in many countries, and links back to the questions of accountability, representation and taxation discussed above.